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GOUDSmIt1
NAtION BUILDING IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: A 
LOCAL ALtERNAtIVE
INtRODUCtION
Nation building is a multifaceted and never 
ending process. It can be about national 
identity (Shore and Wright 1997:24-29; May 
2003:1) and common symbols and rituals 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2001:37-40) or, on the contrary, 
it can be about the official recognition of 
diversity (Van Cott 2000). It is about a 
shared history, but also about the invention 
of tradition and the confabulation of common 
values (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Nugent 
1997:12). It is related to the increasing 
presence of the State, but it would not be 
effective without the popular imagination 
of the powers of the State (Abrams 1988; 
Navaro-Yashin 2002). The development 
industry tends to put the creation and 
maintenance of constructive relationships 
between well-functioning institutions – public 
and private, not-for-profit and for-profit – 
at the centre of nation building. It refers 
to these processes as “Governance” (cf. 
Roche n.d.), and adds “good” or “democratic” 
to this term emphasising institutional 
efficiency and effectiveness, or democratic 
values such as participation, legitimacy, 
equality, transparency, accountability and 
responsiveness.
This paper is written from a development 
perspective placing good or democratic 
governance at the heart of nation building2. 
It argues that the present governance 
approaches in Papua New Guinea need to 
be complemented by one that focuses on the 
local levels of both the State and civil society. 
This is the only way that the structural 
predicament of nation building in Papua 
New Guinea can be addressed: the uneasy 
fit between the State and the governance 
practices of customary social groups3. The 
first part of this paper explains the detrimental 
interaction between these two agencies, 
and the second part makes the case for a 
local approach. The major challenges of 
the corresponding development interventions 
are discussed in the last sections, including: 
selection of the most appropriate level of local 
government to be strengthened, adjustment 
to the fluidity of customary social groups, 
and the strategic choice of intermediate civil 
society organisations.
The arguments draw on my experiences as 
an external advisor to the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID) in 
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Papua New Guinea, where I engaged for 
over a year (2006-2007) in a comprehensive 
consultation process assisting in the design 
of AusAID’s new Democratic Governance 
programme4. This endeavour was part of 
AusAID’s institution wide efforts to refine 
its intervention policies and activities as 
articulated in the Australian Government’s 
White Paper on overseas Aid (AusAID 
2006). The White Paper explicitly includes 
a comprehensive “governance approach” for 
“Fostering Functioning and Effective States”, 
one of its four “Organising Themes” (ibid.:42-
46). This approach articulates the (by now) 
traditional governance view that civil society 
should be strengthened to hold government to 
account, and that government will have to be 
supported in order to efficiently, transparently 
and effectively supply the services demanded 
by civil society.
In practice, however, AusAID’s and other 
development agencies’ governance initiatives 
in Papua New Guinea have mostly boiled 
down to public sector reform, in particular of 
the National Government and its institutions. 
What is more, the few projects in Papua New 
Guinea with an explicit focus on engaging 
civil society have tended to deal with civil 
society as an alternative or antagonist of 
the State, instead of forging constructive 
relationships between them as part of the 
wider nation building project. Most worryingly, 
I hardly found any development intervention 
that considered the need to take customary 
social groups – the mainstay of civil society in 
Papua New Guinea – into account.
UNEASY FIt BEtWEEN StAtE 
AND CUStOm
Many of the present-day problems of 
governance in Papua New Guinea stem 
from the growing linkages and entanglement 
between the relatively new institutions of 
the State and customary social groups. As 
the foundation of civil society in Papua New 
Guinea, customary social groups structure 
the life of most Papua New Guineans. There 
is hardly any Papua New Guinea citizen who 
does not express allegiance to extended 
families, lineages, clans, communities, 
tribes and the like. They may differ in size 
and functions, but customary social groups 
determine the rationale of long-term social 
relationships – of mutual obligations of debts 
and repayments (Strathern 2004:4) –, the 
qualities and contestability of leadership5, 
the ideology of kinship to express group 
cohesion and difference (Sillitoe 1998:142), 
and the general sense of well-being and self-
fulfilment intimately related to the customary 
ownership of land.
An instructive example of the uneasy 
fit between officialdom and custom is the 
mutually debilitating relationship between 
the customary and formal justice systems. 
As anybody slightly familiar with Papua 
New Guinea will tell you, the key difference 
between customary and state law is that 
the former aims at the restoration of social 
relations, while the latter emphasises 
individual culpability. The main means of 
obtaining justice in customary social groups is 
through the payment of compensation, while 
that of the state system is the punishment of 
responsible individuals. Uncodified customary 
law, which flexibly incorporates new ideas 
and practices, is also more responsive to 
changing circumstances.
Admittedly, the formal justice system 
has sought to accommodate customary 
elements. The creation of Village Courts 
constitutes the best recent instance of fruitful 
interaction between the two, and national 
and district courts are authorised to include 
compensation payments in their sentences 
as well. For various reasons, however, the 
articulation of customary and formal justice 
has gone awry in many parts of Papua 
New Guinea. Firstly, since the end of the 
colonial period the public system has been 
increasingly specialised, with the introduction 
(amongst other public offices) of single-
purpose magistrates. This contrasts with the 
practices and ideas of customary authority, 
according to which leadership is (tenuous 
yet) all-encompassing, involving executive, 
legislative and judicial powers. It is argued 
that one of the causes of the relative success 
of the colonial kiap system was that the 
kiap was in effect much more than a district 
magistrate. Importantly, he was also the 
district government agent overseeing public 
services. As part of conflict mediation, these 
services could be increased or withdrawn, 
combining executive and judicial authority 
(Dinnen 2001b:21, 28).
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Secondly, the formal system has 
encroached upon customary practices of 
justice without the institutional capacities 
to replace them properly. On the contrary, 
the violence of many police actions and 
the manipulation of the formal judiciary 
by elites have given rise to the popular 
view of a widening gap between “law” and 
“justice” (Dinnen 2001a:13). The combination 
of an inapt justice system and weakened 
customary law, then, has contributed to the 
increase of lawlessness that is reflected in 
the re-emergence of tribal fighting and the 
rise of domestic violence.
The general mayhem of election campaigns 
and the malpractices of a dysfunctional 
National Parliament also demonstrate the 
problems of a State that has been imposed 
on Papua New Guinea by the former colonial 
power and a tiny local elite. Elections tend to 
revive social divisions and may even create 
new conflicts between customary social 
groups, as candidates scramble to secure the 
necessary votes to get them into Parliament 
(May 2003:4-5). In the process, customary 
relations are mobilised and, once elected, 
Members of Parliament (MPs) feel obliged to 
serve the interests of their customary social 
group instead of the nation. 
The situation is getting worse. The State 
is seen more and more as the source of 
sudden, unconditional wealth (“cargo”), 
and less so as the provider of continuous 
services. As Andrew Strathern reveals:
Reviewing the history of the electoral 
process in Papua New Guinea,… [one 
discovers] a significant shift in voter 
expectations of political leadership 
accompanied by a commodification of the 
voting process… Candidates in the first 
elections for the pre-independence House 
of Assembly in 1964 sought to project an 
image as representatives who could secure 
resources from the colonial administration 
for the benefit of their local areas. This 
image has been superseded by a popular 
view of politicians as being preoccupied 
with advancing their own personal interests 
through continuous factional struggles 
and coalition building. In this situation, 
voters seek to extract benefits directly from 
candidates and officeholders in return for their 
electoral support. This shift has transformed 
the relationship between political actors and 
their electors from one of representative to 
one of patron (in Dinnen 2001b:172).
This exchange of votes for cash, beer 
and projects is part and parcel of what today 
is called wantokism. It may show some 
similarities with the customary relations 
of mutual obligations and authority but, in 
the interaction with state politics, it has 
developed into something quite different 
(and less constructive). In contrast to the 
strictly regulated re-distribution of valuables 
and services within and between customary 
social groups, the wantokism of politics and 
elections implies the more open distribution 
of external resources coming from the State.
Another important source of external 
revenues for customary social groups in Papua 
New Guinea is compensation payments. At 
present, the compensation payments that 
draw most attention (reaching radio talk 
shows and the front pages of the newspapers 
in Papua New Guinea) are those that involve 
(claims to) huge irregular pay-outs from the 
extractive industries. Many compensation 
payments, though, are officially sanctioned 
and channelled through the state apparatus 
(e.g. Mineral Resources Development 
Company). At first sight, compensation looks 
like a customary practice used in modern 
settings. However, it is critical to make a clear 
distinction between compensation payments 
made within and between customary social 
groups, and the modern compensation claims 
that have evolved from the increased linkages 
with the State (and market). Customary 
compensation payments are not just about 
making good a wrong or about the restitution 
of the use of land or the damage of goods - 
they deal essentially with the restoration and 
continuation of existing social relations. This 
is not the case for state agencies and large 
resource companies, which are perceived as 
external agents by the members of customary 
social groups who therefore feel no need to 
establish long-term relationships with them.
What is more, the customary relations of 
mutual obligations restrict the number and 
size of compensation demands because 
of the ever-present possibility of counter 
claims. There is little chance, on the other 
hand, that the Government and resource 
companies will ever call for compensation 
payments from the customary social groups 
in return. In addition, in many parts of Papua 
New Guinea “… the quantity and quality 
of… compensation payments, is traditionally 
determined by the donors, not by the 
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recipients, because… such payments serve 
to augment the social status of the former, 
rather than the latter” (Filer 1997). Hence, 
the modern compensation payments are 
diverging from the customary claims for 
compensation, causing more problems than 
they solve. Again, these problems are the 
result of the recent entanglement of customary 
social groups and new institutions such as 
the State and the extractive industries.
In addition to the justice system, 
elections and Parliament, and compensation 
payments, one may finally draw attention 
to the complexities of landownership, 
which provides a last graphic example of 
the impacts of the uneasy fit between 
State and custom on governance. It is 
generally stated that 97 per cent of the 
land in Papua New Guinea is managed by 
customary social groups according to their 
own systems of land tenure, without title 
deeds. This means that the ownership of 
the land is normally vested in the group, 
whilst individual members have use rights 
over clearly defined pieces of land. The 
case of Papua New Guinea is exceptional 
in that the colonial and post-colonial States 
have always recognised customary land 
tenure and have even protected it from 
appropriation by state agencies themselves. 
Section 53 of the present Constitution 
maintains that “… the government or such 
other public authority must not compulsory 
take ‘property’ or ‘interest in or rights over 
property’ without compensation on just 
terms” (Kalinoe 2004:66).
The collective ownership of customary 
land, however, does not mean that 
customary social groups constitute clusters 
of permanent landowners with rigidly fixed 
usufruct rights. Many women and men in 
Papua New Guinea will use their lands as 
a means to mobilise social relations, i.e. 
to create relations of mutual obligations. 
Accordingly, a member of a patrilineal clan 
may want to share his lands with maternal 
cousins from outside the clan; or he may 
join them in shared work practices on their 
lands, generating or maintaining duties of 
mutual debt payments in goods or services. 
In certain areas of Papua New Guinea, this 
goes so far that it becomes impossible to 
equate customary social groups with land 
(Leach 2004).
Moreover, the reproduction of customary 
social groups in Melanesia is not so much 
based on maintaining and strengthening 
collective interests, but rather is based 
on structural relations of conflict between 
groups and between members of the same 
group. Consequently, group fission (and the 
fusion of weak groups) happens regularly, 
which implies that land will frequently be 
reallocated to newly formed groups. In the 
Highlands it is quite common that clans 
and individuals alienate land, and that land 
is involuntarily redistributed according to 
changing power relations (Weiner 2007).
It is therefore problematic to conceive of 
customary social groups as stable landowner 
groups. This conclusion evidently diverges 
from the impression one gets whilst listening 
to the public debate on “clans”. Government 
officials, mining engineers, the occasional 
development expert etc. tend to equate 
“clans” and “land groups”, considering 
access to land as the single most important 
factor for clan formation and membership. 
This is most clearly visible in the case of the 
petroleum industry in Papua New Guinea 
where clans (and sub-groups within clans) 
that own land in the areas of exploration (and 
additional infrastructure) have been legally 
recognised as Incorporated Land Groups 
(ILGs). As ILGs they receive compensation 
payments for the use of their land.
However, the ILGs have never been 
used to deal with matters of landownership 
per se, as they were legally designed. 
Clan members see the ILG “… solely as a 
petroleum benefit-receiving body” (Weiner 
2007:120). More worryingly, the growing 
awareness and popularity of obtaining 
compensation payments from the State 
and the extractive industries amplifies the 
significance of landownership as a defining 
feature of customary social groups (Filer 
1997). This distorts the dynamics of mutual 
obligations and the organisational flexibility 
inherent in these groups. It sets in stone 
what uses to be temporary group fissions 
and fusions and the ensuing conflicts. We 
only have to look at the former troubles in 
Bougainville to imagine what the results can 
be.
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tHE CASE FOR GOING LOCAL
At present, the State is debilitating 
customary social groups, and customary 
social groups impair the effectiveness of 
the State. Public sector reform, then, is not 
sufficient to build the Papua New Guinean 
nation because the problems are neither only 
of the State nor merely technical – they are 
structural, originating from the incongruity of 
two distinct modes of governance6. Therefore 
the Papua New Guinea Government and the 
development industry will have to develop 
alternative interventions to complement 
their traditional approaches to address the 
structural predicament of governance.
Obviously, such interventions should be 
as much about the State as about customary 
social groups. Taking the latter seriously 
would imply quite a change of attitude 
amongst development practitioners in Papua 
New Guinea. It is not unusual, for instance, 
to hear Papua New Guinea Ministers publicly 
declare that the challenge of development is 
“how to get beyond the clan system”. Other 
specialists add that it is difficult to conceptualise 
“customary groups as stakeholders with 
which an aid programme can deal directly”. 
They criticise customary practices for not 
being fully participatory, for being an obstacle 
to gender equality or for other shortcomings, 
depending on their respective fields of 
expertise. But circumventing the complex 
issues of custom (and its relation to the 
State) by concentrating on the alleged “real” 
business of institution building, growth, anti-
corruption etc. will not solve the structural 
issue of nation building in Papua New Guinea 
(cf. White 2006:3). Instead, one will have 
to try finding ways to adjust development 
interventions to the organisational flexibility 
of customary social groups, and to build 
on the strong relations of obligation and 
reciprocity within these groups that help to 
achieve a high level of accountability of their 
leaders, and transparency of the decision-
making processes and the (re)distribution of 
resources.
Hundreds of customary social groups 
operate at the local level, with relatively few 
relations between them. Papua New Guinea 
is a fragmented country in which more than 
seven hundred language groups try to live 
together despite ethnic divisions. For most 
contemporary women and men in Papua New 
Guinea, the young State is far off and they 
live and organise themselves according to 
alternative customary modes of governance. 
Subsequently, a governance approach in 
Papua New Guinea that attempts to create 
the institutional partnerships critical to nation 
building cannot do so without strengthening 
State and civil society agencies that go 
beyond the local level, at which customary 
social groups tend to work best. However, 
in order to constructively address the critical 
issue of custom, a governance programme 
also needs to intervene at the local level 
of society, where the positive democratic 
aspects of customary governance are at 
play. Well-run customary social groups do 
not reach the national level, and only a few 
exceptions reach the intermediate level. On 
the contrary, it is the excesses of the uneasy 
fit between the State and custom that I have 
discussed in the previous paragraph (e.g. 
wantokism) that dominate at the national and 
intermediate levels.
The additional advantage of an approach 
that focuses on customary social groups 
as the local sources of Papua New Guinea 
nation building is that it will show the huge 
local social and economic variability of 
Papua New Guinea. This guarantees a high 
degree of specialised local understanding 
and locally appropriate development 
interventions, increasing local ownership and 
aid effectiveness.
A local governance approach, though, 
poses major challenges. Without pretending 
to be complete, three key challenges emerged 
during the consultation process of AusAID’s 
Democratic Governance programme: the 
strategic selection of local government 
agencies, the development of local institutions 
in accordance with customary practices, and 
the strategic selection of intermediate civil 
society organisations.
tHE LOCAL StAtE: COmPEtItION 
AND COmPLEmENtARItY
The issue is not to re-define the State, but 
rather to re-juggle competencies, financial 
flows and support to local government 
  Nation Building in Papua New Guinea: A Local Alternative
6
agencies that are best suited to create 
constructive relationships with customary 
social groups. According to the 2000 census 
Papua New Guinea has a population of about 
5,100,000 people who live in 20 provinces 
(including the National Capital District and 
the Autonomous Region of Bougainville), 
divided into approximately 89 districts and 
311 Local-level Governments (LLGs). A local 
approach, then, urges one to compare the 
performances of LLGs and districts to find out 
which of these two levels of local government 
may either complement or compete with 
customary social groups.
From a strictly formal point of view, LLGs 
are the most democratic institutions in Papua 
New Guinea7. The core members of the 
LLGs are the Councillors of the constituent 
wards who are each directly elected by their 
inhabitants8. LLGs also have the potential 
to be the most responsive state agencies 
because they operate at the most local 
level. Accordingly, since the state reforms 
of the mid-1990s, LLGs have accrued quite 
an impressive range of legal rights and 
responsibilities. They have a wide variety 
of law-making powers9, they are able to 
raise revenues through taxes and licensing10, 
and their administrative functions include 
annual budgets and the design of five-year 
development plans11. Furthermore, they are 
supposed to provide a long list of services, 
such as: the construction and maintenance of 
airstrips, bridges, feeder and access roads, 
water supply, waste disposal, and elementary 
and primary schools; administration of 
Village Courts and provision of auxiliary land 
mediation services; literacy and non-formal 
education; sports and recreation, etc. (Public 
Sector Reform Management Unit 2005:31).
However, Papua New Guinea reality is 
unruly. LLGs in the provinces of East and 
West New Britain may have some leverage 
but, in general, LLGs are dysfunctional, 
especially in the Highlands. Rural LLGs tend 
to receive funds that barely cover the staff’s 
salaries and the allowances of the Councillors, 
and these financial resources come in late. 
Most revenues are stuck in the national and 
provincial administrations. More alarmingly, 
even if all the allocated money did indeed get 
through, it would still not be enough to cover 
the LLGs’ legally sanctioned functions (Filer 
2004:2). Recently the National Economic and 
Fiscal Commission of Papua New Guinea 
(NEFC) carried out a review of the actual 
services delivered by the various levels of 
sub-national government (National Economic 
and Fiscal Commission 2005). Regarding 
the LLGs, it provides disheartening reading. 
Few are the services put into effect by the 
LLGs, and these are mostly restricted to 
monitoring, identifying, assisting, additional 
funding, maintenance (e.g. grass-cutting of 
air strips), providing information, and a little 
inspection. Importantly, LLGs do not seem 
to have the capacity to coordinate service 
delivery, except for some liaison activities 
in cases of land acquisitions and mediation, 
and for Village Courts. Very little is happening 
in the LLGs.
Many districts are not much better off. 
District Administration staff is under-trained 
and only a fraction of the officially allocated 
financial resources for the development 
of the districts tend to reach the District 
Administrations’ coffers. In general, though, 
they seem to operate more efficiently and 
effectively than LLGs. District Administrations 
incorporate the most local government 
divisions of education, health, works, 
community development, agriculture and 
livestock, and so forth, implementing the 
national sector policies within the districts. 
The District Administrator coordinates and 
oversees the sectors within his district, which 
should help to ensure that it meets certain 
minimum standards, especially in health, 
education and infrastructure (Public Sector 
Reform Management Unit 2005:28, 30)12.
The NEFC review of service delivery by 
District Administrations is still downcast, but 
it does not compare as badly with its legal 
responsibilities as do the LLGs (National 
Economic and Fiscal Commission 2005). 
The District Administrations initiate policies, 
establish community projects, provide 
training, extension work, education and health 
services, carry out inspections, operate and 
maintain rural facilities (health, education, 
agriculture), etc. Furthermore, staff of the 
District Administrations seem more stable 
than LLG staff because they are less likely 
to be hired and fired at the whims of (newly 
elected) Councillors.
The reasons for the differences in 
performance between District Administrations 
and LLGs are not only financial or technical, but 
also institutional. The District Administrations 
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have LLG divisions just as they have health, 
education or works divisions. In Papua New 
Guinea, public governance LLGs are treated 
as a sector next to other sectors; they 
are structurally not considered to be critical 
points of coordination between sectors. 
Therefore, the District Administrations are 
the most viable of local state institutions, 
able to provide coordination and secure 
constructive relations among state agencies 
and between state agencies and civil society 
organisations.
The District Administration, though, is 
the least democratic of local government 
institutions. It is mostly an  administrative 
body overseen by the Joint District Planning 
and Budget Priorities Committee (JDPBPC), 
which determines and controls budget 
allocations (including those for LLGs). The 
JDPBPC is chaired by the MP of the district, 
who is joined by the Presidents of the 
LLGs within the district, and a maximum of 
three members appointed by the MP (“…in 
consultation with the heads of the Local-level 
Governments…”)13. As most districts consist 
of three LLGs, this means that the MP and his 
appointees hold considerable power within 
the Committee. What is more, the district 
MP directly receives funds from the National 
Government, which he can spend as he sees 
fit, without consulting the JDPBPC14.
Yet the legitimacy of the LLG is highly 
questionable and the District Administration’s 
legitimacy may well exceed it if one takes 
into account the relative compatibilities with 
existing customary modes of governance. 
Going beyond the confines of formal 
representative democracy, the present 
analysis stresses the importance of such 
compatibility. In a highly fragmented country 
like Papua New Guinea, the more local the 
level, the more types of authority one finds. 
The democratically elected Ward Councillors 
of the LLGs, Village Court Magistrates, 
church leaders, and customary big men (and 
chiefs) may compete for leadership, trying 
to exploit different sources of authority at 
the local level. In some regions of Papua 
New Guinea these functions converge in 
a few powerful men holding many kinds of 
leadership positions, but in other regions 
Councillors will be seen as mere competitors. 
In this situation – where local men and women 
weigh problematic electoral processes against 
religious significance, juridical competence, 
or customary leadership – it is debatable 
whether they consider the elected Councillors 
to be their most legitimate leaders.
In contrast, few sources of authority 
encompass a whole district. Generally 
speaking, MPs and District Administrators 
only experience the competing authority of 
the larger churches at the district level. 
In this sense they provide complementary 
leadership to more local customary positions 
of authority, bringing groups together and 
delivering services with relative effect. The 
local legitimacy these factors generate mean 
that District Administrations, instead of LLGs, 
are the preferred local government agents to 
be strengthened by a governance strategy 
that genuinely involves customary social 
groups.
CUStOmARY SOCIAL GROUPS: 
FLUID INStItUtIONS
The stability of well-functioning institutions 
is generally used by evaluators and donor 
agencies as an important indicator of the 
sustainability of development interventions 
– it is also considered to be at the heart of 
nation building. The sheer pervasiveness 
of customary social groups in Papua 
New Guinea society, then, requires a 
closer look at the customary potential to 
secure such institutions. The discussion of 
customary landownership, however, already 
revealed that group fission is common and 
that customary social groups should not 
be confused with fixed, unified corporate 
landholding groups. Customary relations 
of mutual obligations may appear to be 
inflexible because Papua New Guineans 
use a well-developed kinship vocabulary 
to render these relations intelligible, but in 
practice they actually detach and affiliate 
themselves from one customary group to the 
other with relative ease. Customary social 
groups are willing to incorporate different 
kinds of kin and outsiders, and migrants 
can be granted usufruct rights of customary 
lands in new locations (Weiner 2002:5-6; 
Leach 2006). Common residence and the 
shared knowledge of important places in the 
landscape (with procreative and productive 
powers) are important additional elements to 
perceived kinship relations that bring people 
together. This is what has been described 
  Nation Building in Papua New Guinea: A Local Alternative
8
as the “… celebrated fluidity of Melanesian 
social groups…” (Sillitoe 1998:140).
The fluidity of customary social groups 
implies that they seldom operate as a political 
unity with long-term goals and strategies, even 
when they are relatively stable. Collective 
actions take place within customary social 
groups but members are relatively free to 
ignore them if these activities are deemed to 
be of little personal benefit. “The groups that 
form are thus transient collections of people 
who think that it is in their individual interests 
temporarily to coordinate their actions to 
achieve some goal. A group with exactly 
the same membership is not likely to come 
together again” (ibid.: 143).
As a result, the development industry in 
Papua New Guinea has been particularly 
unsuccessful in establishing so-called 
Community Based Groups (CBOs). A singular 
feature of such CBOs in Papua New Guinea 
is their institutional frailty. Set up to manage 
community development projects such as 
literacy courses, resource centres, drinking 
water systems, communal guests houses, 
micro credit schemes and the like they have 
tended to crumble as soon as the respective 
development programmes close down or 
shift their attention to other communities. 
Cases have been recorded in which the 
simple migration of the chairperson resulted 
in the demise of the CBO. An NGO in the 
Eastern Highlands went so far as to ascertain 
that CBOs are a “fantasy” of the development 
industry. The NGO only works with school 
boards and individual families15.
In many ways the challenges and flaws 
of CBOs are similar to those of community 
groups related to the extractive industries. 
Without stretching the comparison too far, it 
is safe to say that ILGs and similar landowner 
associations operating in the impact areas of 
large resource companies will have a hard 
time surviving once the respective company 
they depend on leaves the region and ends 
its support. Like CBOs without external 
support of development programmes, these 
organisations will probably disappear.
The Community Development Scheme 
(CDS), a development programme formerly 
funded by AusAID, almost by accident 
stumbled upon a viable alternative of 
institutional development that builds on the 
fluid customary mode of governance. Short 
on quality staff and civil society organisations 
in Papua New Guinea that were able to deliver 
demand-driven community development 
on the scale and of the type required by 
the programme, CDS trained and mentored 
“field workers”. In effect field workers are 
local development workers who have the 
capacities to facilitate thorough processes 
of participatory planning and evaluation, and 
to conduct training within communities16. 
Its success has recently been confirmed 
by the Papua New Guinea Government, as 
the Field Worker competency-based training 
and accreditation system has officially been 
approved by the National Apprenticeship & 
Trade Testing Board (NATTB), which sets 
national occupational skill standards.
In East New Britain, a field worker 
association has even been established and 
the Papua New Guinea NGO Community 
Development Initiatives Foundation Trust 
(CDI) – one of the driving forces behind the 
accreditation system – has suggested creating 
a nation-wide Community Development 
Workers Association whose membership 
consists of field workers and other kinds of 
community development workers who have 
successfully completed the accreditation 
programme. However, this seems to be 
taking the field workers’ success one step 
too far. On the contrary, the field worker 
initiative has been thriving because it was 
never intended to become a stable institution. 
Unintentionally, this fitted the “celebrated 
fluidity” of customary social groups well. It 
suffices that field workers are well trained, 
developing a critical mass of women and 
men with strong participatory planning 
capabilities who will strengthen customary 
social groups (and other agencies). The 
importance of the training and accreditation 
system, then, lies more in the creation of a 
kind of field worker “movement” of loosely 
related community development workers, 
rather than in institutionalising field workers 
into another national body that may very well 
lose its relations with the grassroots – as has 
happened with many national agencies in 
Papua New Guinea.
Accordingly, the inherent fluidity of 
local associations also privilege concrete 
development practices such as participatory 
planning. In contrast to the formation of 
organisations such as CBOs, these processes 
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coincide with customary practices of 
mobilisation, organising transient groups in a 
flexible way for concrete purposes. Customary 
groups and intermediate organisations such 
as the District Administrations, churches 
and NGOs will create partnerships, and will 
plan and coordinate at a supra-group level, 
but they may each go their separate ways 
and carry out individual projects as soon 
as the process of participatory planning is 
completed17.
Fortunately, recent trends in the 
development industry have increasingly 
incorporated the informal aspects of 
institutional development (see, for example, 
United Nations Development Programme 
2002; Department for International 
Development 2007:7). The significance of 
fluid customary governance practices in 
Papua New Guinea confirms the value of 
such approaches. However, the sustainability 
of most governance programmes is still 
measured by the creation or strengthening 
of well-functioning organisations – public 
and private, for-profit and not-for-profit. 
The flexible terms set by customary social 
groups imply that such a strategy would 
be detrimental to local governance, and to 
nation building in Papua New Guinea in 
general.
CIVIL SOCIEtY: NEtWORKS 
VERSUS PARALLEL SYStEmS
Civil society, like the State, involves 
intermediate organisations that are vital for 
the delivery of services and for fostering 
constructive relationships with and amongst 
customary social groups – in short, for building 
the nation from the bottom up. And like the 
State, a local approach implies strategic 
choices about the kinds of intermediate 
civil society organisation that suit best the 
development processes of customary social 
groups and their relations to the State18.
The various churches in Papua New 
Guinea are obvious choices. Since the 
nineteenth century these civil society 
organisations have provided health care 
and education to the local population. They 
have established social and institutional 
networks that go well beyond the customary 
social groups, laying the foundations of an 
incipient nation. In most parts of Papua New 
Guinea, they preceded the (colonial) State. 
They have also established, with relative 
success, one of the few types of CBOs that 
seem to be sustainable – faith-based women 
groups. Moreover, local clerics and church 
branches use to be involved in the mediation 
of conflicts and the reconciliation between 
different customary social groups. The 
church members’ continued religious interest 
guarantees the institutional sustainability of 
most of the churches and their governance 
endeavours at the local level.
Nevertheless, the churches also show 
where intermediate civil society organisations 
may find obstacles working at the local level. 
Most churches are hierarchical organisations 
that are managed from the national, or 
sometimes even international levels, which 
means that they are not always able to 
fully exploit their excellent social networks 
amongst customary social groups. Local 
church branches tend to have little scope to 
redirect resources that have been earmarked 
at the (inter)national level, struggling to react 
flexibly to valuable initiatives originating at 
the local level. With regard to the churches’ 
relationship with the State, the picture is 
rather mixed as well. In some districts, 
churches coordinate fittingly with local state 
agencies, but in others they circumvent the 
State, pointing at the lack of public funds 
and the machinations of local politicians. In 
the process they create a parallel system 
that may weaken the State, or which at the 
very least may not promote viable districts 
capable of coordinating and monitoring the 
delivery of services (by the churches).
In the Papua New Guinea development 
industry, NGOs are at the heart of the civil 
society debate, showing more potential than 
other intermediate civil society organisations 
such as the few trade unions, producer 
associations, business and professional 
bodies, and independent policy centres19. 
For good reasons, though, the Papua New 
Guinea Government is rather wary of NGOs. 
It draws attention to the parallel system to the 
State that NGOs may create, as it receives 
external funds for carrying out services that 
are public sector responsibilities. Considering 
the limited number of effective NGOs in 
Papua New Guinea, this concern looks likely 
to be overstated and in practice local state 
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agencies may well welcome the work of 
NGOs20. Short of resources for services 
and development projects themselves, the 
local state sometimes teams up with NGOs, 
supporting them with small inputs of petrol, 
use of government cars or people. The 
Government’s concern, then, seems more 
to express a fear of strengthening NGOs, 
which might eventually result in the creation 
of a parallel system to the State. One should 
indeed be worried, if international experience 
is anything to go by.
Grassroots groups, furthermore, claim 
that Papua New Guinea NGOs usually 
operate at the national level, ignoring the 
local level, working out of the country’s 
capital Port Moresby (or Lae). They express 
serious concerns about the NGOs’ priorities 
and about the NGOs’ unwillingness to work 
in remote areas. And when NGOs work in 
the communities, people do not seem to 
be particularly impressed by the so-called 
“bottom-up” planning, which often fails to 
respond to local demands. Some local 
NGO workers confirm these institutional 
flaws, arguing that time constraints restrict 
participatory processes and that project 
initiatives and funds are mostly managed 
by the national offices, limiting the ability of 
local NGO branches to carry out projects 
effectively in a highly diverse country like 
Papua New Guinea and to react flexibly 
to changing local circumstances. Like the 
churches and the State, NGOs tend to 
conduct their business in the straightjacket of 
national organisational structures. 
For all that, NGOs are a diverse group 
of civil society organisations in Papua New 
Guinea. For the sake of analytical clarity, 
countering some of the above critique, one 
could distinguish between two categories 
of NGOs: generalist NGOs and specialised 
NGOs. Each of them plays a different role 
in promoting nation building at the local 
level and each of them presents different 
dilemmas.
The fear of a parallel system to the State 
is justified in the case of generalist NGOs 
covering a wide range of different activities. 
Over time, NGOs are likely to turn into broad 
service providers incorporating the newest 
fads in the development industry. But by 
carrying out services in sectors as diverse 
as health care, agriculture, water supply, 
(informal) education, the environment, 
gender, democratic governance etc. 
these generalist institutions have become 
successful competitors of the State in various 
parts of Papua New Guinea. And by not 
sufficiently coordinating their activities with 
local government agencies, they weaken the 
Papua New Guinea State in the process.
Among the most efficient and effective 
generalist NGOs are various BINGOs, big 
international NGOs. Their presence seems to 
be even more contentious. Not surprisingly, 
within the local NGO community “… there is 
increasing perception of the parasitic nature 
of BINGOs” as they compete for donor 
funds (CDS n.d.: 27). More worryingly is the 
suggestion of development specialists in 
Papua New Guinea that BINGOs would be 
less inclined to engage in a serious processes 
of local governance because its leadership is 
“… usually provided by non-citizens who may 
not feel comfortable in political agendas” 
(ibid.:30). This would obstruct constructive 
partnerships with District Administrations and 
the like because these state agencies are 
inherently political.
Ironically, the NGOs that pose the most 
threat to the State are also the ones that tend 
to work most closely with customary social 
groups in the communities. In general terms, 
generalist NGOs in Papua New Guinea – 
national and international – seem to have 
established solid social networks at the local 
level. The challenge for these NGOs is 
to combine these social networks with a 
constructive relationship with the State. CDI 
is one of the few generalist NGOs that has 
managed to do just that, focusing many of its 
activities on strengthening LLGs (which one 
could criticise) and signing memorandums of 
agreement with the Provincial Governments 
of the provinces it works in. 
Specialised NGOs, on the other hand, 
run less of a risk of creating parallel systems 
to the State. They may crowd out local state 
agencies in particular sectors (e.g. health, 
HIV/AIDS, or drinking water) but the State will 
still have a chance to remain (or become) an 
active actor in other sectors and remain the 
general coordinator of local development. This 
applies in particular to NGOs that specialise 
in democratic governance activities such 
as peace building, conflict resolution, civic 
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education and advocacy. The nature of these 
activities requires coordination with other 
local actors – peace requires multi-party 
negotiations, and civic education will only 
have a considerable impact if combined with 
other more tangible community development 
interventions.
In this sense Papua New Guinea has a 
comparative advantage in relation to other 
developing countries. A substantial share 
of its NGOs is actually quite specialised. In 
contrast to many of the generalist NGOs, 
however, most specialised NGOs in Papua 
New Guinea rely on quite feeble social 
networks in the communities. This is a serious 
drawback, considering that nation building in 
a country as diverse and fragmented as 
Papua New Guinea starts locally. In addition, 
the specialist advocacy NGOs that are much 
favoured by the international development 
business to demand good governance from 
the State do not have much impact on what 
happens at the local level in Papua New 
Guinea. Whilst not ignoring the importance 
of national advocacy activities, in order to 
multiply their impact they need to establish 
solid social networks with the customary 
social groups in the communities.
CONCLUSION
By any account building a nation in a 
country as diverse and fragmented as Papua 
New Guinea poses major dilemmas for 
policy makers and development experts. 
Traditionally, the Government and the 
development industry in Papua New Guinea 
have concentrated on strengthening the State, 
particularly at the national level, expecting 
that this could mould a country with more 
than seven hundred language groups into a 
nation. The results have been partial, to say 
the least. A key reason is the unconstructive 
entanglement between the young Papua 
New Guinea State and “clans”, or customary 
social groups. The tensions between the 
official justice system and customary law, 
political wantokism, exorbitant compensation 
claims, and the contradictions between the 
state ideology of permanent landownership 
and the fluidity of customary social groups, 
show the uneasy fit between officialdom and 
custom in Papua New Guinea. Until recently 
the State has not addressed this structural 
problem of nation building. On the contrary, it 
seems to have exacerbated it by weakening 
customary modes of governance without 
replacing them with a viable alternative.
Public sector reform, then, will have to be 
complemented with development approaches 
that deal with the structural problem of 
entanglement – not to disentangle the State 
and customary social groups (which is 
impossible), but to turn this relationship into 
a mutually beneficial interaction. In order to 
achieve this, such approaches will have to 
focus on the local level at which customary 
social groups operate fluidly and in relatively 
democratic ways, building the nation from the 
bottom up. This does not necessarily imply a 
strong push for decentralisation or some kind 
of cultural reveille romanticising customary 
practices of governance. Decentralisation 
may just replicate the problems of the central 
State at the local level, and the absence 
of women in customary public debate is a 
useful reminder of the drawbacks of custom. 
It means that the development industry will 
have to come to terms with customary social 
groups instead of circumventing the issue. A 
few strategic options are suggested to foster 
partnerships between the State, customary 
social groups and a selection of intermediate 
civil society organisations, reinforcing each 
other’s strengths in order to build the nation. 
In the process, the modes of governance of 
the State and customary social groups will 
gradually be transformed.
The productive engagement between 
well-functioning inclusive institutions is 
best achieved by strengthening District 
Administrations (instead of LLGs) and 
by promoting fluid means of institutional 
development at the local level, such as 
capacity development of “field workers” and 
participatory planning. These processes 
better correspond to customary practices of 
authority and mobilisation than more traditional 
institutional development strategies which, for 
instance, have tried in vain to establish stable 
CBOs in Papua New Guinea. Moreover, the 
churches and specialist NGOs play important 
roles in nation building from the bottom up. 
The position of generalist NGOs, however, 
is more controversial because they tend 
to supplant the local State with a broad 
range of public services traditionally provided 
by the State. A specialist advocacy group 
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vehemently criticising the Papua New Guinea 
Government may be more constructive than 
a generalist NGO. The former takes the 
(flaws of the) State system very seriously, 
whilst the latter may very well ignore it.
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I am most grateful to Judith Ugava-Taunao 1. 
for her invaluable support during the year 
long consultation process (2006-2007) 
that I carried out as an external advisor 
to the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) in Papua New 
Guinea. It is important to note, though, that 
the views expressed in this paper are the 
author’s only and they do not represent 
AusAID’s position. The critical comments 
made by the anonymous reviewers of this 
article are much appreciated.
As a development practitioner I 2. 
underscore the import of governance 
programmes. As a social scientist I may 
want to highlight the risks of development 
interventions stressing the potential for 
unintended detrimental effects. This 
article, however, is a policy paper that 
does not deal with the fundamental 
critique of the development industry and 
governance programmes per se.
The Papua New Guinea Government, 3. 
business circles and development 
workers tend to talk about “clans” instead 
of customary social groups. However 
customary social groups in Papua 
New Guinea hardly fit into the classical 
meaning of clans seen as the fixed 
building blocks of a rigid segmentary 
social structure organised on the basis 
of unilineal descent. For this reason the 
more generic term “customary social 
group” is preferred (Filer 2007).
This is not to say that AusAID will 4. 
necessarily heed the suggestions 
described in this paper. At the time of 
writing the new Democratic Governance 
program had still not started.
In a few coastal areas chieftainships exist 5. 
where leadership is ascribed and limited 
to certain families, but in most of Papua 
New Guinea leadership is more openly 
contested on the merits of becoming a 
“big man”.
Terms such as “incongruity” and “uneasy 6. 
fit” facilitate analysis. However, it is 
important to note that they maintain a 
contrast between custom and modernity 
which many Papua New Guineans do 
not experience as such. They blend both 
domains into coherent practices and 
understandings of themselves and the 
world around them. An interesting example 
is how members of the Kivung movement 
in Pomio (East New Britain) consider the 
World Bank to be accumulating money 
that they have offered to the alternative 
and superior underground Government 
of the dead. This is why they think the 
World Bank in Papua New Guinea 
clashed with the actual Papua New 
Guinea Government which they perceive 
as corrupt (Lattas 2006:139-141).
This paragraph focuses on LLGs in the 7. 
countryside, where most Papua New 
Guineans live. Urban LLGs have not 
been consulted.
Rural LLGs also include two appointed 8. 
women representatives but they tend to 
have little influence in the official decision-
making processes.
Organic Law on Provincial Govern-9. 
ments and Local-Level Governments 
(OLPGLLG), sections 26, 44 and 46.
OLPGLLG, sections 82, 83 and 87.10. 
Local-level Governments Administration 11. 
Act 1997, section 38.
See also OLPGLLG, section 74.12. 
OLPGLLG, section 33a.13. 
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Half of the District Support Grants, see 14. 
OLPGLLG, section 95a. Despite the 
recent changes to the electoral system in 
Papua New Guinea (limited preferential 
voting) the MPs still tend to be elected 
by a limited percentage of their district 
constituencies. They mostly depend on 
restricted customary allegiances directing 
most of the accessible state resources 
to associated clans and tribes. This 
electoral favouritism shows at all levels 
of government in Papua New Guinea. Its 
critical analysis is beyond the scope of 
the present policy paper.
15.  School boards, faith-based women 15. 
groups, and local church branches are 
notable exceptions constituting relatively 
stable CBOs that do not directly answer 
to the pervasive logic of customary 
governance.
See CDS, Field Worker Monitoring and 16. 
Evaluation Report, produced in 2006.
Participatory planning seems to suit the 17. 
local situation in Papua New Guinea but 
it is not the development panacea that 
some of its practitioners claim it to be. For 
a critique of participatory methodologies, 
see for example Cooke and Kothari 
(2001), and Goudsmit and Blackburn 
(2001).
For the sake of analytical clarity this 18. 
analysis replicates the common practice in 
the development industry to conceptualise 
a clear distinction between the State and 
Civil Society (see for example AusAID 
2006, Department for International 
Development 2006). However, there is 
much to be said against such a dichotomy 
as “… it holds empirically questionable 
assumptions about the degree to which 
civil society can be seen as autonomous 
from the state…” (Gaventa 2006: 15). 
For additional critique of the Civil Society 
concept, see Warren (2001:32-34, 
56-58).
These organisations are few and far 19. 
between, tend to have limited institutional 
networks, and are either weak or operate 
almost exclusively in the national capital.
By the end of 2006 CDS had identified 20. 
around 30 NGOs – secular and faith-
based – with the potential to play an 
important role in the development of 
Papua New Guinea.
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